- REMAGEN and MONTANA MAULER
(March-April 1969)
- Military operations in
rough or mountainous terrain usually call for infantry; however,
the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), conducted
successful operations in the highlands of Vietnam with an
armored-mechanized force. Several materiel innovations made this
success possible: the exclusive use of cargo helicopters to
establish a line of communications, new aerial resupply
techniques to assist the helicopters in providing logistical
support, and the use of the armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB)
to maintain ground mobility within the task force. Finally, the
organization of the brigade itself was an innovation that gave
it great flexibility and power.
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- The 1st Brigade, 5th
Infantry Division (Mechanized), a unique and versatile
organization, was the last major U.S. tactical unit to arrive in
Vietnam. It included the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; the 1st
Battalion, 11th Infantry (Light); the 1st Battalion, 61st
Infantry (Mechanized); the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor; and the
5th Battalion, 4th Artillery (155-mm. Self-propelled). Shortly
after arriving in Vietnam the brigade was placed under the
operational control of the 3d Marine Division. The brigade's
commander received most of his combat and combat service support
from the division. The brigade often conducted combined
operations with South Vietnamese forces in the near-trackless
terrain adjacent to the demilitarized zone and the Laotian
border. In April of 1969, Colonel James M. Gibson conducted a
dual operation by splitting his brigade: an armored infantry
task force operated on the Khe Sanh plateau, and the rest of his
force engaged in Operation MONTANA MAULER in the central
demilitarized zone.
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- In March 1969,
intelligence reports indicated that the North Vietnamese once
again were moving across the Laotian border in the direction of
the A Shau Valley. Air reconnaissance had revealed an extension
of Route 926, which the Viet Cong were building from the old
Route 92 on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, across the lower end of the
Khe Sanh plateau in the direction of the A Shau Valley.
Long-range patrols
had reported hearing trucks and tracked vehicles moving along
this new road.
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- Because of these
reports, the 3d Marine Division deployed one reinforced regiment
to prevent the enemy from using this route and to search out
possible North Vietnamese Army base areas in the northern
extension of the A Shau Valley. At the same time, the XXIV U.S.
Corps commander sent an armored task force to the Khe Sanh
plateau to open up Route 9 to Khe Sanh, cut Route 926, and
protect the west flank of the Marine regiment. This armored
force was composed of elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division (Mechanized). It was given the code name of Task Force
REMAGEN and consisted of two mechanized infantry companies; a
tank company; a self-propelled, 105-mm. artillery battery; a
reinforced armored engineer platoon; a platoon of 40-mm.
antiaircraft "dusters"; and a battalion headquarters element.
Initially, command and control of the task force was provided by
the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor. Later, this unit was replaced by
the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry (Mechanized), and the task
force was enlarged. A troop of ARVN cavalry was among the units
reinforcing the task force. Each battalion headquarters brought
its organic scout and mortar platoons, its combat trains of
tracked maintenance vehicles, and most of its supply section. At
the height of the operation, there were over a hundred tracked
vehicles in the task force and no wheeled vehicles.
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- In March 1969, the
last secure position on Route 9 was at a bend in the road called
Ca Lu. From this point, the road wound upward through a valley
for about thirty miles until it reached a high plateau. The
ruins of the ancient town of Khe Sanh sat along a stream in the
middle of this plateau. The infamous airstrip lay about a mile
north of the town.
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- There were several
narrow defiles and one unfordable mountain stream along the road
from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. An armored vehicle launched bridge was
needed to span the stream. However, since there were no forces
available to secure this span and the adjacent defiles, the
bridge had to be retrieved after the last vehicle in the armored
column had crossed. This meant that there would be no land line
of communication behind Task Force REMAGEN. The armored task
force had to be supplied completely by air during the entire
operation.
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- For forty-seven days,
Task Force REMAGEN ranged up and down the Laotian border. It cut
the Viet Cong Route 926, it defeated several attacks by elements
of two North Vietnamese Army regiments, and it took a heavy toll
of enemy casualties. It also captured numerous enemy weapons,
documents, and equipment. During this time, the men of the task
force consumed over 56,000 meals, used over 59,000 gallons of
gasoline and diesel fuel, and fired over 10,000
rounds of
artillery ammunition. The maintenance sections of the task force
installed 12 engines, 18 sets of tracks, and 7 transmissions and
performed numerous other maintenance chores under field
conditions. All of this material and equipment was brought to
the task force in the field by Army CH-47 (Chinook) or Marine
CH-46 helicopters. This feat involved a considerable logistic
effort, representing about fifteen sorties by the supply
helicopters every day for forty seven days. In addition to the
CH-47 and CH-46 helicopters, brigade UH-1 helicopters were used
to deliver mail, meals, and spare parts.
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- Mechanized infantry
played a key role in the success of the operation. It provided
one of the two command and control headquarters, bore the brunt
of the fighting, took the greatest number of casualties, and
inflicted a resounding defeat upon the enemy in every
engagement. In this instance, the mechanized rifle companies
served in their traditional role, reinforced with the tank
company. However, these rifle companies operated in a wild and
rugged area over thirty miles from the nearest friendly
installation. Once again, they demonstrated their flexibility
and proved that no terrain was inaccessible to them.
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- From their sanctuaries
across the Laotian border, the North Vietnamese launched a
number of attacks against the night positions of the task force.
A typical night attack occurred on 25 April, beginning with an
extensive mortar barrage at 0330 hours. An estimated battalion
from the 304th North Vietnamese Army Division was attempting to
overrun and destroy the night defensive position of the 2d
Troop, 7th ARVN Cavalry. Team ARVN, as the unit was designated,
was under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 61st
Infantry (Mechanized). The heavy mortar barrage was followed by
a determined ground attack using rocket propelled grenades,
small arms, automatic weapons, flamethrowers, and satchel
charges. Unable to penetrate the position, the enemy quit the
field at 0600 leaving behind 33 dead North Vietnamese soldiers,
several weapons, and 300 prepared satchel charges.
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- Three days later the
enemy tried again. The commander of Company A, 1st Battalion,
61st Infantry (Mechanized), had prepared his defenses well. The
company was alerted by the men at a listening post, who sprang
an ambush on the enemy soldiers as they were moving into
position. Again, the enemy attack was supported by fire from
rocket propelled grenades, mortars, small arms, and automatic
weapons. Throwing satchel charges and using flame devices, the
enemy troops charged from the southwest but were unable to
penetrate the perimeter. Before dawn they again withdrew and
disappeared into the night. This time 34 of their soldiers were
killed, small arms and automatic weapons littered the
battlefield, and 500 satchel charges lay undetonated.
At 1100 hours, Company C,
1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, was air-assaulted
into the area to help re-engage the enemy. At the same time the
remainder of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry (Light), was
functioning as part of Operation MONTANA MAULER, being conducted
far to the northeast also by the 1st Infantry Brigade. Enemy
contact by this element was recorded in the brigade's after
action report.
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- Two ground troops of
the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, were sent into an area in which an
NVA Regiment was suspected to be located. Being small enough to
invite an attack by an enemy regiment, yet strong enough to be
able to defend itself until reinforcements could arrive, the
cavalry was able to draw the enemy into a fight. Once contact
was gained the cavalry was able to develop the situation so that
additional forces could be intelligently committed to the battle
in an attempt to close with and destroy the enemy.
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- The 1st Battalion, 11th
Infantry, was being used as an airmobile reserve, prepared to
reinforce the cavalry. When this battalion was later committed,
a U.S. Marine Corps rifle company was attached to it. Thus a
most unusual combination resulted: REMAGEN, a U.S. -ARVN
armored-mechanized infantry force, without a single wheeled
vehicle and no land resupply route; and MONTANA MAULER, with
light infantry in airmobile reserve. Both of these forces
contained Marine Corps units, and the brigade reported to the 3d
Marine Division. Lieutenant General William B. Rosson,
Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, said of such
operations:
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- I am persuaded that
the mixture of Marine Corps and Army forces within III MAF
[Marine Amphibious Force] is a desirable and productive
arrangement. Indeed, of things learned during my several
assignments in Vietnam, I accord top billing to the realization
that when Marine Corps and Army units are teamed together, as in
Provisional Corps Vietnam, their capabilities combine to produce
a force possessing greater power and effectiveness than would be
the case if the same units operated separately. Rich are the
gains in cross infusion of ideas and experiences. Equally rich
are rewards achieved by shifting of assets belonging to one
service to support operations by the other when such action
promotes the common good, e.g., helicopters, artillery, tanks,
amtracks.
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- Task Force REMAGEN displayed
this shifting of assets from one service to support another, as
Marine resupply helicopters supported the task force and Marine
artillery fired in support of it.
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- Several measures were taken to
accomplish the aerial resupply. A forward supply element was
established at Vandergrift Combat Base, where supplies and
repair parts were assembled for shipment by helicopter to Task
Force REMAGEN. All types of class-I supplies, such as sundry
packs, B rations, and C rations, were also stockpiled.
Petroleum, oil, and lubricant supplies were ordered from brigade
stocks to meet demands as they occurred. Over 75,000 gallons of
fuel were delivered to the maneuver units in 500-gallon, rubber
drums. The transfer of fuel from the 500-gallon rubber drums to
the armored vehicles of the task force sometimes posed a
problem. Wherever possible, the force of gravity was used;
however, a modified M113 bilge pump was
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- UH-1 HELICOPTER MAKES
DELIVER
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500 - GALLON COLLAPSIBLE DRUMS FILLED WITH FUEL
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- designed and constructed by the
task force maintenance section. This pump greatly reduced the
restrictions on the refueling of the vehicles. The brigade's
supply officer made arrangements with the Marine Logistics
Support Unit for the supply of munitions. As the after action
report on Task Force REMAGEN stated:
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- Overall, Task Force
Remagen received from Vandergrift over 200 aerial lifts
representing over 1 ° million pounds plus an additional 50, 000
pounds of hot meals, mail and spare parts flown in on brigade UH
1's. A UH-1 was a daily necessity for retail distribution of
parts, mail and meals from the combat trains area to the users.
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- During this period, Operation
MONTANA MAULER was also being resupplied by air with an average
of 12.7 short tons a day. Certain aerial resupply procedures and
techniques were developed due to the jungle environment and
monsoon weather in the Republic of Vietnam.
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- Natural sources of water were
sparse in the area where forces were committed to Operation
MONTANA MAULER. As in many other operations in Vietnam, water
had to be transported to the troops by helicopter. There were
several ways to carry the water. The water can usually issued by
the government could be used; however, once the water was
consumed, the troops either had to wait for the helicopter to
return to carry away the empty cans or they had to destroy them.
They were too bulky and heavy for the rifleman to carry over the
- broken and rough
terrain. Although plastic water containers could be collapsed
when empty and therefore were much easier to carry on the backs
of troops, they too were a nuisance. They were frequently lost
or damaged in the jungle.
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- The troops of the 1st
Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), developed a third
method to supply water to the rifle companies in the field. The
empty shell casings provided by the 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery
(155-mm. Self-propelled), were cleaned and filled with water and
transported to the troops in large numbers. Once the shell
casings were empty, they were either buried or otherwise
discarded. In this way, troops were not burdened by the
containers, and they could not be used by the enemy.
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- A lightweight
collapsible container, nicknamed "lug-a-lug," was also used.
This container, as in the case of the five-gallon metal water
container, could not be air-dropped from any appreciable height
above the jungle canopy. Therefore, the unit on the ground still
had to clear a landing zone. A newer container was developed
consisting of several plastic inserts protected by a crushable
cardboard covering. It could withstand a free fall of up to 300
feet and thus often eliminated the need to clear a landing zone.
This three-gallon container proved to be very useful,
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- Before the commitment of Task
Force REMAGEN, other innovations had been developed in Vietnam
to improve aerial resupply techniques. Early in 1967, the A-22
cargo sling was employed. This device decreased the number of
man-hours spent in preparing resupply items for aerial delivery,
reduced the amount of handling, and allowed more sorties to be
flown in a given period of time. Also, because of the insulation
of the cargo bag, there was less spoilage of food. In another
effort to improve aerial resupply, artillery ammunition was
packed ahead of time for aerial delivery loads during periods
when the demand was light, in order to allow a continuous flow
during periods of heavy demand.
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- Inclement weather, a
frequent deterrent to aerial operations in Vietnam, was combated
somewhat by using ground controlled approach radar in landing
zones for aerial resupply under instrument flight conditions.
The procedure was developed initially at Camp Evans, a major
logistic base in South Vietnam. Resupply helicopters were guided
by means of a radioed vector from Da Nang and Hue Phu Bai
airfields to areas above the overcast where visual flight was
possible and then directed to Camp Evans. Ground controlled
approach radar would then guide the helicopter as it approached
touchdown. This method was also used successfully with
helicopters carrying external (sling) loads. During the month of
February 1968, the 228th Combat Support Helicopter Company flew
over 700 hours in instrument weather conditions. Included in
that figure were over
twenty missions with sling loads.
Several hundred instrument approaches were made without a single
mishap. The system established during Operation DELAWARE in
April 1968 to provide instrument approach into the A Shau Valley
is a good example of this radar technique. Over twenty aircraft
could be controlled or monitored simultaneously by radar to and
from the valley.
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- A simple expedient was
developed by the infantryman to provide visual contact between
air and ground elements during darkness. The M79 grenade
launcher was broken open as when loading the weapon, and a light
source was inserted in the breech. This practice provided a
highly reliable directional signaling and marking device, which
could be seen clearly by the pilot or aircraft crew but not by
other persons on the ground. The operator merely pointed the
light as though aiming at a target.
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- To reach the Laotian border
area and the Khe Sanh plateau, Task Force REMAGEN had to cross
over old Route 9 from Ca Lu to the border. Engineer troops had
been attached to assist in this job. Company A, 7th Engineer
Battalion, provided a reinforced engineer platoon, and four
bulldozers were made available by the 14th Engineer Battalion
and the Marine 11th Engineer Battalion. The armored vehicle
launched bridges in the task force served a dual purpose. The
power and traction of the vehicle made it an excellent tank
retriever, when not being used in its primary role. The task
force had two of these vehicles. The AVLB can launch its
eighteen-meter bridge without exposing the crew to enemy fire.
The launcher can then pick up the bridge on the far bank and
continue along in support of the assault forces. During the
operation, thirteen bypasses were constructed around destroyed
bridges, the AVLB's were launched six times to span washouts and
bridge abutments, and the entire road was swept for mines.
Several enemy antitank mines were detected and destroyed along
the route. The engineer effort was greatly simplified by using
only track-laying vehicles during the operation. Wheeled
vehicles of any type were prohibited.
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- Part of the mission of Task
Force REMAGEN required the pioneering of a new trail along the
Cambodian border from Route 9 south to Route 926. In heavy
growth, land navigation sometimes became a problem due to
limited visibility. One device used to solve this problem was a
magnetic pilot compass mounted in the armored personnel carrier
to maintain the approximate proper magnetic azimuth for the
force.
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- The success of Task Force
REMAGEN was described by Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P. Milia,
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, in these words:
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- The mission was a
natural for an armored task force. The scouts reconnoitered;
mech infantry moved rapidly to secure the high ground; armored
- ARMORED
VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGE
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- engineers pioneered a
road; armored artillery and mortars provided continuous fire
protection. When the preliminary work was completed, the tanks
thrust deep into the Khe Sanh plateau reaching the Laotian
border one day after crossing the LD at Calu [sic].
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- The 1st Brigade, 5th
Infantry, presented a good example of the innovative nature of
the war in Vietnam. The rugged, unpopulated territory, the
enemy's nearness to its supply bases, and the large area of
operation required fast-moving, independent task forces capable
of aerial resupply and reinforcement.
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